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SPEECH BY THE PREMIER, MR. DUNSTAN, ON URANIUM AT CANBERRA, AUGUST 24th, 1978. 
Last year the Australian Labor Party faced one of. the most d i f f icu l t and important 
decisions i t has ever been called upon to make. I t was a decision which would 
affect the lives not only of every Party member, but of every person l iv ing in 
Australia - and their children and their children's children. 
I t was a decision which had to balance personal health and personal safety against the 
promise of national economic gain, the unquantifiables of general welfare and human 
rights against the cash-in-the-bank enticements of technological progress. 
I t 
was a decision which brought acutely personal, local and national concerns alongside 
the most sweeping international questions. I t was a challenge to Australia to declare 
where i t stood in the world, whether on principle or by expediency. 
I t was a decision which above all decisions demanded that ordinary people stop and 
take stock of our society and where i t was going, and judge sophisticated economic 
and sc ient i f ic opinions for what they were worth, and reduce them to human terms. 
I t was a decision which demanded that Labor come clean and declare where i t stood -
for people or for prof its, for true human well-being or short-term gain. 
I f we are frank, i t was also a decision which had the potential to divide the Party 
internally and weaken i t s position in the eyes of the community. 
I am proud to say that Labor rose to that challenge - and rose to i t magnificently. 
I t faced the uranium issue square, without shirking, and laid down a policy which 
even in the short space of a year has been proven time and time again to be the 
right one, the responsible one. 
In that time we have learned a l i t t l e more about nuclear technology. We have seen 
forecasts of effecti 
ve demand for uranium revised and revised again. We have seen 
some of the genuine economics of the nuclear industry emerge from the military-, 
industrial shadows. And we have seen the ebb and flow of international relations. 
President Carter's campaign against the plutonium economy - whether sincerely based 
or merely a chauvinistic attempt to assert United States supremacy in the international 
uranium industry - i s in tatters. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation has 
become an exercise in fu t i l i t y . And as for Australia, well, against all expectations, 
Nareen has not become the navel of the nuclear world. 
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Remember all that power we were supposed to wield, as a major supplier of uranium 
to the energy hungry world? 
Remember all the arms we were going to twist with our Synroc safeguards agreements? 
Australia has not changed the course of international nuclear policy and shows no 
promise of doing so. Instead we are lumbered with a travell ing circus of cynicism 
hell bent on signing up the most motley crew of nuclear hazards you could imagine. 
Labor's policy not to proceed with the development of Austral ia ' s uranium 
resources for export - until adequate safeguards are available - rests on conclusions 
drawn from the best available evidence in half a dozen main areas. 
The f i r s t area i s that of the physical hazards associated with the development of 
uranium resources and their use fo the production of nuclear power or nuclear 
weaponry. Quite clearly we are prepared as a society to accept the hazards and the 
benefits associated with the use of a range of radioactive materials - in medicine, 
in industry, and even domestically. We are aware there are r i sk s , but we are 
conf ident that they are so small o r so manageable that they are acceptable. When 
we come to uranium mining and the nuclear industry, however, the scale of operation 
i s so greatly increased that the hazards are multiplied geometrically. And the 
further you go along the nuclear fuel cycle the more intense the hazard becomes. 
And the more intense the hazard, the greater the risks that come from human f ra i l t ie s . 
The actual mining of uranium, properly conducted in appropriate circumstances, may 
not be an acute risk to l i fe and limb. Even the actual process of enrichment may be 
no more hazardous than a range of other industrial processes which we are prepared to 
tolerate for the benefits they bring. But as soon as f i ss ion i s involved, the 
potential dangers are so great that i t can only be after the most rigorous proof of 
safety that we can afford to go ahead and take the risk that s t i l l remains. 
An incident in 1976 at the Brown's Ferry reactor in the United States brought the 
potential enormity of human error in the f iss ion process to the world's attention. 
A f ire broke out amongst cables feeding the reactor's elaborate safety mechanisms. 
For six hours the reactor's cooling system was inoperable and there were grave fears 
of a meltdown, and all the disastrous consequences that would have entailed for 
thousands of people. Only minutes before the reactor had reached i ts cr it ical stage 
technicians were able" to cool i t manually, and a tragedy was avoided. 
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The Brown's Ferry power station, the most modern in the United States at the time, 
had, l ike the Titanic, been lauded for i t s safety features. Yet, the f ire which 
nearly caused i t s destruction was caused by the flame of a candle which was being 
used by a technician to test for draughts. 
I think i t ' s worth noting that the head of safety and design for General Electric, 
the company which built the Brown's Ferry reactor, joined two other senior engineers 
in resigning. Dr. Minor now campaigns to bring the public 's attention to the chi l l ing 
potential of human error in the nuclear f iss ion process. When he vis ited Australasia 
two years ago his message was quite clear: "At the present time nuclear f iss ion is 
unsafe and the benefits received from the nuclear energy production cannot compensate 
for tragedies which may occur. The gamble is not worth the r i sk . " 
I have no intention of launching into some pseudo-technical discussion about the 
stage of the art as far as the management of nuclear fuels and the disposal of high 
level wastes are concerned. I f we are rea l i s t ic , I think i t i s clear that 
perceptible progress is being, made by way of technical responses to the tremendous 
problems posed by the waste disposal question. We should not close our eyes when 
we are presented with Synroc, or whatever the next marginal advance may be of this 
kind. But i t i s crucial that we should keep them in the proper perspective. 
I f we are to go ahead with nuclear development, we must have not only a technically 
feasible process, we must have a commercially feasible one. And the process i s of 
l i t t l e use unless we have a repository. 
Let us assume for the moment - and i t i s some assumption - that Professor Ringwood 
had, ready to go, a foolproof process for the safe storage of high level nuclear 
wastes deep underground in impervious structures. Once underground, we assume, the 
material poses no threat to human l i fe . Yet - even with that sort of arrangement -
we do not have anything like a waste disposal fac i l i ty . Even the Americans, in 
their optimism, cannot see their f i r s t nuclear waste disposal repository available 
for use for at least another ten years - and that makes no allowance for the.people 
of New Mexico who are to have this Federal bounty bestowed upon them. So much' for 
Mr. Fraser and his confident statements that solutions to these problems were now 
available. I f he was such an ally-- of Jimmy Carter back then ( I hardly think even 
B i l l y Carter would have him on the team now) i f he was such an a l ly , why didn 't someone 
s l ip him an advance copy of the U.S. Government reports? 
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The answer is sure to come back that we know how to do the job in principle, that 
the practical it ies will be worked out over the next ten years, and meantime we can 
confidently store the wastes above ground - "temporarily", as they say. Well, talk 
about a pig in a poke. I f you buy that you ' l l buy just about anything. You'l l have 
yourself snap frozen in the hope that someone will perfect the details of everlasting 
l i fe before the next power failure. 
The important thing is that the technology should not only be "on the shelf" but 
actually and certainly used. Not promised hopefully in the future, but guaranteed 
now. How can Australia go hawking i t s uranium around the world with no greater 
guarantee that high level wastes will be disposed of properly than an undertaking 
to get around to doing something in ten years. I t ' s simply laughable. 
Let us look briefly at economics. I will pass over the dramatic downward revisions 
in projected demand for uranium which have been made in the last year. And for the 
time being I will pass over the meally mouthed morality of the supposed Australian 
responsibility to meet the importunate demands of the energy hungry countries of the 
world, queuing up with generously drawn purchasing contracts in their hands. 
Much of the attraction of the nuclear power industry has been in the long vaunted 
claim that, though very capital intensive, i t s running costs, and especially i t s fuel 
costs are very low. As time has gone by and technical reactor design has improved, 
-the economics have seemed to improve. I t has begun to look not only a paying 
proposition for particular fuel-scarce countries but increasingly worthwhile for 
general use as well. I t ' s a pity then that i t has only been in the last eighteen 
months or so that the realisation has started to dawn generally that the books.have 
been cooked. I t ' s a pity that no-one has been costing in the huge front-end 
research and development costs borne by the Pentagqn and other Defence Departments, 
and to some extent by universit ies. No-one has been costing in the running subisidies 
for enriched uranium, provided again for the mos/t part through military establishments 
I t i s a pity that no-one thought to account for the vast cost of decommissioning 
obsolete plants - walling them in with a massive bulk of concrete where they stand, 
or carving them up for removal to a final disposal s i te. I t ' s a pity that no-one 
has added in the future costs of boring holes three kilometres or so into the earth's 
crust to take the high level wastes. To say nothing of the army of men that will be 
needed effectively to police the safeguards agreements. 
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No, i t ' s not a pity. I t ' s a crying shame. 
What about those safeguards, then? Before Withersgate and the Medibank Massacre, 
the anomalies in Fraser's safeguards policies looked quite extraordinary. I t ' s cold 
comfort to realise now that they were really just run of the mil l . Think back to the 
ALP conference when Party policy on uranium was set. They were the times when 
Australia was going to use i t s international muscle as potential major suppliers of 
uranium to force the most stringent requirements on customer countries accorded the 
rare privilege of access to our resources. Canada had improved on U.S. agreements. 
Australia was going to leapfrog over Canada. The undeniable forces of international 
economies and pol it ics were cojoining to ensure that nation after nation was going 
to declare i t se l f wi l l ing to accept what would normally be regarded as intrusions 
on their sovereignty to permit the Australian safeguards requirements to be 
observed - full accounting for materials, on-site inspections, guarantees against 
diversion to non-peaceful purposes - the works. In short, Malcolm Fraser super star. 
What do we have now? We have a model safeguards agreement for the protection of the 
interests of the citizens of Australia that is so t ight, so perfect in i ts form, so 
protective of our welfare that the Prime Minister will not let any of us see i t . 
Apparently on the grounds that i t would.be diplomatically embarrassing to reveal 
the framework of discussions with particular countries. Or more l ikely because i t 
would reveal the extent to which the Government has been wi l l ing to negotiate away 
the long-term interests of Australian in return for the hope of a quick sale of uranium 
to justify in arrears all the haste and hustle about Ranger. 
We have an agreement with Finland. We're told i t ' s supposed to be some sort of a 
milestone for our global safeguards strategy. But what sort of agreement i s i t . 
In the f i r s t place i t ' s an agreement concluded with a country that happens to have 
i t s uranium enriched by the U.S.S.R. That makes i t al l very traceable. Mr. Fraser 
promised that Australia would continue to improve and upgrade safeguards but there 
i s nothing in the agreement with Finland to make that possible. I t even contains 
amongst other things, a clause for arbitration when the parties cannot agree. 
Some safeguard. 
We've had Mr. Anthony in Paris trying to persuade the French to sign something 
with us - precisely at the time when the French were conducting their latest nuclear 
tests in the Pacific. The line we used to be sold was that Australia would deal 
only with countries that have ratif ied the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and 
gone a good deal beyond that as well. But France has not signed the N.P.T. although 
we were doing our best to negotiate with her. Even worse, France i s providing 
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materials and technologies to other countries who are not signatories to the N.P.T. 
and do not observe the I.A.E.A. safeguards along the nuclear road. 
I suppose at least Doug Anthony i s being straight forward enough to cut out the 
moralising about the Fraser Government's uranium strategy. He was the one who 
came clean and said we had better dig i t up and sell i t quickly before the market 
vanishes. 
But we are doing better than that. We have had negotiations with Iran and with the 
« 
Philippines. South Korea is on the l i s t . All I can say i s that Mr. Fraser i s 
doing the anti-nuclear cause a good turn. He is showing just how frai l the"safeguards 
arrangements s t i l l are. When he announced what the Government chose to call i t s 
"acceptance" of the Fox Report, he said arrangements now existed to keep nuclear 
developments under control. But the most conspicuous activity since then has been 
the sight of Mr. Justice Fox touring the world attempting by all human means to 
develop something that would have a remote chance of sticking. All strength to 
his elbow - but the greater his dedication and the harder he works the more obvious 
i s the Government's prevarication. 
Instr ins ica l ly , there are very d i f f icu l t problems to be dealt with in the area of 
safeguards and materials accountancy. They are problems that must be given the 
most serious and constant attention. 
Whether we have an expansion of the nuclear industry or not, whether we plunge 
ourselves into the plutonium economy or not, i t i s imperative that these arrangements 
must be improved. But let us not delude ourselves. All these arrangements do l i t t l e 
more than wave the threat of international disfavour after the event i f a customer 
country chooses to break all the agreements and divert material to the manufacturer of 
nuclear weapons. 
The state of technology is such that i t has become a comparatively simple process for 
a country determined to acquire a nuclear capacity to do so. The report of the U.S. 
Office"of Technology has pointed out that within a matter of days after abrogation 
of safeguards agreement a nation could produce a nuclear explosive. 
Until we are much further along the track all the huffing and puffing on Austral ia ' s 
part about our enforcement of international safeguards amounts to the vicious threat 
that when the fall-out has settled and the nuclear war i s over, we will rigorously 
comply with a clause of the agreement and thrash the responsible country with a 
feather. Perhaps i t would be more appropriate i f the agreements were composed in 
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Improvements can and must be made on the more detailed aspects of materials 
accountancy. I am personally very sceptical that sovereign nations will get to 
the point of providing sufficient international inspectors to police existing or 
improved arrangements. They will be even less l ikely to allow these international 
inspectors a consistent free reign in their own territory that wil l be necessary for 
truly effective systems. 
As a Ford Foundation study has pointed out there can be l i t t l e confidence that 
even withfull-time inspectors in enrichment and re-processing plants, diversions 
of enough plutonium for a single explosive could be detected. 
That i s not to discount the advances that have been made. Not so long ago the 
problem of material that was lost, stolen or strayed was under very close attention. 
At that stage i t was called - very perceptively I thought - Material Unaccounted 
For - that is MUFs. But the attention came a l i t t l e too close, something had to be 
done - and i t was done. They changed the name. We no longer have MUFs, we now 
have Inventory Differences. I wonder what Sigmund Freud would make of the new 
meaning of ID. 
In conclusion, I think we can say quite truthfully that new evidence, and indeed the 
events of the past twelve months have served only to confirm the wisdom of 
Labor's policy not to proceed with the development of uranium resources for export 
until such time as adequate safeguards are available. 
But that is no reason for us to s i t back and preen, to congratulate ourselves on our 
foresight and enlightenment. We have to make sure that the message i s received 
clearly and consistently in the community. We have to make sure that our position 
i s accepted, and not only accepted, but understood. 
I t ' s not enough to tap into some of the deep concerns people have about our advanced 
technological society or play on fears and emotions about nuclear dangers. 
Unless we bring to our argument a deep and settled conviction about nuclear issues, 
we are dealing with slogans. no,t pol icies; dabbling with rhetoric rather than truly 
trying to shape a better more responsible woxld-. 
The nuclear question i s a complex and changing one. We can't just make a decision 
and then close our minds to the significance for better or for worse of future 
developments. Nuclear technology is changing steadily. The actual use of that 
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technology is changing too - some countries are moving into nuclear programmes. 
Others, the United States among them, are pulling back from the grandiose plans • 
of a few years ago. . 
Gradually, better information is emerging about the true longer-term costs of 
nuclear power generation, an issue previously clouded by the huge front and rear-
end subsidies provided by the defence industries. Public opinion is changing and 
developing. We must keep up with all th i s , and make sure that our stand i s informed 
as well as principled. 
The strength of the Labor policy i s that i t takes all these aspects into account, 
and s t i l l emerges with the strongest emphasis on the well being of all Australians, 
the overall welfare of our country. 
Increasingly, our opponents are finding i t d i f f icu l t to deny the evidence of a 
whole spectrum of issues concerned with the mining and export of uranium -
reactor safety, waste disposal, proliferation and the problems of international 
safeguards agreements. That evidence makes i t quite clear that Labor was right when 
i t called upon Australia to "play i t safe" with uranium. 
I changed my mind about uranium. -Like the„ALP, I 'm prepared to change again. 
But any change.will be based on the facts, and not on emo.tions or parochial se l f 
interest. , 
Thank you for giving me the opportunity of speaking to you tonight. 
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